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SEXUAL INFIDELITY AND LOSS OF  
SELF-CONTROL: CONTEXT OR CAMOUFLAGE? 
 








R v Clinton and others involved three appeals from trial on various 
matters concerning the “loss of control” partial defence to murder created by 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 („the Act‟).1 This case commentary is 
concerned with the appeal of Jon Jacques Clinton, as it addressed the ambit of 
the Act‟s controversial exclusion of sexual infidelity from the grounds upon 
which a defendant can base her loss of self-control.
2
 The Court of Appeal‟s 
decision (Lord Chief Justice, Henriques J, Gloster J) is not uncontroversial 




Jon Jacques and Dawn Clinton had lived together for 16 years and been 
married since 2001. The marriage, hampered by severe financial difficulties 
and a mutual history of depression, was disintegrating despite a desperate 
desire on behalf of Mr Clinton for it to work.
3
 However, Mrs Clinton had left 
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the matrimonial home, leaving behind the children from the marriage, and 
was conducting an affair. As far as she was concerned the relationship was 
over. 
On 13 November 2010 Mr Clinton, previously suspicious that his wife 
was having an affair, was informed by her of her extra-marital relationship. 
This resulted in Mr Clinton, on the evening of that same day, stealing and 
vandalising Mrs Clinton‟s Land Rover, her most prized possession. On 15 
November, the day of the actual killing, Mr Clinton “tortured himself” by 
looking at images he found online of his wife in the company of her lover, a 
Mr Montgomery, and, at about 12:30 that day, was able to confirm her 
infidelity by viewing sexual images of his wife with Mr Montgomery.
4
 By the 
time husband and wife met later, at about 2pm, Mr Clinton had taken 80mg of 
Codeine and had drunk about a quarter of a bottle of brandy.
5
 Further drink 
and codeine was consumed by Mr Clinton during the highly emotional 
encounter that followed, which focused on recrimination concerning Mrs 
Clinton‟s affair and other extra marital sexual activity.  
According to Mr Clinton the encounter was characterised by Mrs Clinton 
displaying unprecedented contempt for him, in which she viciously and 
explicitly taunted him about her sexual activity with 5 other men and cast 
aspersions on his courage when, having established that Mr Clinton had 
looked at suicide websites, stated “you haven‟t got the fucking bollocks”.6 In 
addition she displayed indifference to their children in the form of hurtful 
comments to the effect that she had done her bit where they were concerned 
and that they were Mr Clinton‟s responsibility from now on.7 Furthermore, on 
being reproached by Mr Clinton about her sexual infidelity on her daughter‟s 
birthday, Mr Clinton “heard her kind of snigger”.8 
As a result of this behaviour, Mr Clinton claimed he went into some kind 
of altered state; Lord Judge CJ, who summarised Mr Clinton‟s evidence in 
delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said: “...the walls and the 
ceiling just seemed to close in. She was talking but he could not hear what she 
was saying. He could see her mouth opening and closing. He could hear a 
noise, like the distant sea. He wanted everything to stop. He wanted 
everything to slow down.”9 It was at this point that Mr Clinton killed his wife. 
The police found evidence of the fatal attack in the form of beating (there 
were head injuries) and strangulation (there was a ligature around her neck). 
After the killing he removed most of her clothes and took photographs of her 
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in various positions, which he then sent via text to Mr Montgomery.
10
 He was 





THE LAW AND THE DECISIONS 
 
In order for the “loss of control” partial defence to reduce murder to 
manslaughter, there must be a loss of self-control rooted in a qualifying 
trigger as defined by the Act. Section 55(4) of the Act states that a qualifying 
trigger is: 
 
“...a thing or things done or said (or both) which— 
(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, 
and 
(b) caused [the Defendant] to have a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged.”12  
 
At trial Judge Smith, before addressing her mind to the potential presence of 
this trigger, excluded all the evidence relating to sexual infidelity in the name 
of s 55(6)(c) of the Act, which states: 
 
“In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying 
trigger— 
(c) the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity 
is to be disregarded.” 
 
Judge Smith then considered whether the additional explanations for Mr 
Clinton‟s loss of self-control, which were Mrs Clinton‟s contempt for his 
supposed lack of courage to commit suicide and her indifference to the 
children, satisfied the requirements of s 55(4). She was concerned with this 
question because s 54(6) of the Act stipulates that the judge must be 
persuaded, before allowing the jury to consider the defence, that evidence has 
been adduced such that a “jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude 
that the defence might apply”, including, therefore, whether evidence has 
been adduced to enable a jury reasonably to conclude that a qualifying trigger 
is operative. Thus the presence of a qualifying trigger is made subject to 






 This is not the only matter defined by the Act as a qualifying trigger: s 55(3) refers 
to “fear of serious violence from [the victim] against [the defendant] or another 
identified person.” Furthermore, s 55(5) allows a qualifying trigger to be made up of a 
combination of the matters mentioned in s 55(3) and (4).  
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control not only, axiomatically, by the jury when deciding whether certain 
facts meet the statutory definition of a qualifying trigger, but also, as a result 
of s 54(6), by the judge in the form of a preliminary filter to ensure that claims 
of loss of self-control are not improperly put to the jury. Judge Smith 
concluded that a jury, properly directed, could not reasonably conclude that 
the defence might apply once she had excluded the evidence of sexual 
infidelity; as a result, she removed the defence from the jury‟s consideration 
and Mr Clinton was convicted of murder.  
On appeal, Lord Judge CJ acknowledged that if Mrs Clinton‟s sexual 
infidelity and her references to it had to be ignored under section 55(6)(c), 
then Judge Smith‟s decision to withhold the defence from the jury under s 
54(6) “was unassailable”.13 Thus it was agreed that no jury could reasonably 
conclude that Mrs Clinton‟s comments about Mr Clinton‟s lack of courage to 
commit suicide and his having to look after the children could, together, 
constitute “circumstances of an extremely grave character” and could cause 
Mr Clinton “to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged”. However 
Lord Judge CJ rejected Judge Smith‟s exclusion of sexual infidelity for the 
following reason: 
 
“However, to seek to compartmentalise sexual infidelity and exclude 
when it is integral to the facts as a whole ....... is unrealistic and carries 
with it the potential for injustice. ...In our judgment, where sexual 
infidelity is integral to and forms an essential part of the context in 
which to make a just evaluation whether a qualifying trigger properly 
falls within the ambit of sub-ss 55(3) and (4), the prohibition in s 
55(6)(c) does not operate to exclude it.”14 
 
As a result of what shall be termed the contextual approach, Lord Judge CJ 
concluded that Judge Smith had “...misdirected herself about the possible 
relevance of the wife‟s sexual infidelity”.15 In light of this, he also concluded 
that “the totality of the matters relied on as a qualifying trigger, evaluated in 
the context of the evidence relating to the wife‟s sexual infidelity, and 
examined as a cohesive whole, were of sufficient weight to be left to the 
jury”.16 He therefore ordered a retrial. In so doing, Lord Judge CJ confined s 
55(6)(c) to those occasions when the defendant seeks to rely exclusively on 
sexual infidelity as the explanation for a loss of self-control. His Lordship 




15 [77].  
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found support for this conclusion in statements to the same effect made by 
Government spokespersons in the Parliamentary debates.
17
  
Thus the effect of sexual infidelity as context is that it is no longer 
excluded by s 55(6)(c) and, once admitted, can convert evidence insufficient 
to satisfy s 55(4)‟s demanding definition of a qualifying trigger into evidence 
that is sufficient. This potential of sexual infidelity, when conceived as 
„contextual‟, to supplement and reinforce factors not caught by s 55(6)(c) so 
that the evidence as a whole constitutes a qualifying trigger means that sexual 




This commentary will argue that his Lordship was wrong to adopt the 
contextual approach for 3 reasons. Before outlining these reasons, it is 
necessary briefly to discuss a point of clarification made by Lord Judge CJ 
concerning in what ways, if at all, s 55(6)(c) embraces verbal references to 
sexual infidelity, in addition to acts of sexual infidelity.  
 
“THING DONE OR SAID” 
 
Section 55(6)(c) presents many difficulties of interpretation, as noted by 
Lord Judge CJ.
19
 One particular difficulty is how “a thing...said”, as opposed 
to “a thing done”, can constitute sexual infidelity.20 This issue was pertinent to 
Clinton because Mr Clinton sought partly to rely, in explaining his loss of 
self-control, on his wife‟s taunting regarding her sexual activity with other 
men. It is arguable that such taunts are not excluded from being a qualifying 
trigger by s 55(6)(c) because they do not constitute a form of sexual infidelity, 
but merely refer to it. Such a literal approach to the provision would confine it 
                                                     
17
 [40] to [44]. These statements are from Angela Eagle on 3 March 2009, Claire Ward 
on 9 November 2009 and Lord Bach on 26 October and 11 November 2009. They can 
be found at www.parliament.uk.  
18 Lord Judge CJ cites an example at [24]: he refers to a history of physical abuse 
followed by a taunt of sexual infidelity: the sexual infidelity would be considered “the 
final straw” according to Lord Judge CJ. Lord Judge CJ also states that the sexual 
infidelity in this case would enable the defence to be available even when the previous 
abuse alone would not be enough. For further discussion of this example, see n 27 
below and associated discussion in the text.  
19 Counsel for the Crown described the provision as “formidably difficult”, counsel for 
Clinton as “extremely ill drafted”. (I am indebted to counsel for the Crown, Andrew 
Edis QC, and counsel for Clinton, Michael Birnbaum QC, for sending me their 
skeleton arguments, which were very helpful in my research for this case 
commentary.) Lord Judge CJ acknowledged the difficulties of interpreting the 
provision at [14]. 
20
 This difficulty has been noted by David Ormerod: see Smith and Hogan’s Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13
th
 edn, 2011) p 521.  
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to those occasions, perhaps rare, where the words used are in fact a form of 
sexual interaction, for example „phone sex‟ and words of a sexual nature 
uttered during sexual activity.  
However, where “a thing...said” is concerned, Lord Judge CJ did not 
adopt a literal approach. Stating that confining the ambit of the provision to 
“words spoken to his or her lover by the unfaithful spouse or partner during 
sexual activity” would be “unrealistic”,21 he gave the provision a wider 
meaning, stating: “In our judgment things „said‟ includes admissions of sexual 
infidelity (even if untrue) as well as reports (by others) of sexual infidelity”.22 
As a result, according to Lord Judge CJ, Mrs Clinton‟s taunts regarding her 
sexual infidelity, true or otherwise, are, subject to the contextual approach, 
embraced by the s 55(6)(c)‟s exclusion of sexual infidelity, in addition to her 
affair.  
This broader view of the range of behaviour embraced by s 55(6)(c) must 
be correct, since it would be both illogical and impracticable to permit taunts 
regarding sexual infidelity to constitute a qualifying trigger, whilst 
simultaneously excluding acts of sexual infidelity. As will be discussed in 
greater detail below, s 55(6)(c) is targeting a possessive and controlling 
attitude to sexual partners, and such an attitude is triggered as much by verbal 
references to sexual infidelity as it is by knowledge of acts of sexual 
infidelity.  
However, having decided, correctly, that the exclusion embraces 
references to sexual infidelity in addition to sexual infidelity itself, 
nevertheless Lord Judge CJ held, as we have seen, that, on this occasion, 
evidence of such references were admissible, along with the evidence of Mrs 
Clinton‟s affair, because he felt that her sexual infidelity, and her references to 
it, formed part of the context of other factors not excluded by s 55(6)(c). The 
question is whether this contextual approach is the correct interpretation of s 
55(6)(c)? There are three reasons for thinking not. 
 
THREE REASONS FOR REJECTING THE CONTEXTUAL 
APPROACH 
 
Reason 1 for Rejecting the Contextual Approach: a Contrasting Use of the 
Singular and Plural 
 
A contrasting use of the singular and the plural within s 55 suggests a 
literal reason for rejecting the contextual approach. To explain, it is necessary 
to quote s 55 almost in full: 
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“(2) A loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger if subsection (3), 
(4) or (5) applies. 
(3) This subsection applies if [the Defendant‟s] loss of self-control 
was attributable to [the Defendant‟s] fear of serious violence 
from [the Deceased] against [the Defendant] or another 
identified person. 
(4) This subsection applies if [the Defendant‟s] loss of self-control 
was attributable to a thing or things done or said (or both) 
which— 
(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, 
and 
(b) caused [the Defendant] to have a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged. 
(5) This subsection applies if [the Defendant‟s] loss of self-control 
was attributable to a combination of the matters mentioned in 
subsections (3) and (4). 
(6) In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying 
trigger— 
...; 
(c) the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity 
is to be disregarded.” 
 
It is argued that, given the use of the singular and plural in s 55(4) (“was 
attributable to a thing or things [emphasis added] done or said (or both)”), a 
qualifying trigger can be made up of several things said and/or done. 
Furthermore, such things can also be accompanied by fear of serious violence 
as a result of s 55(5). Thus a qualifying trigger can be made up of a 
multiplicity of factors. Attention should now turn to the contrast between the 
use of the singular and plural in s 55(4) (“thing or things”) and the exclusive 
use of the singular in s 55(6)(c): “the fact that a thing done or said constituted 
sexual infidelity is to be disregarded”. The fact that a qualifying trigger can be 
made up of several elements, and the contrast between the use of the plural in 
s 55(4) and the use of the singular in s 55(6)(c), would seem to result in the 
following literal meaning: whether by itself or amongst other factors, sexual 
infidelity is to be disregarded. This appears to be s 55(6)(c)‟s plain meaning, 
requiring that sexual infidelity be ignored even when accompanied by other 
factors.  
 
Reason 2 for Rejecting the Contextual Approach: the Contextual Approach as 




A closer examination of the outcome of Clinton and the implications of 
the contextual approach reveal that it enables sexual infidelity to act as the 
main and indeed predominant qualifying trigger despite s 55(6)(c).  
Lord Judge CJ agreed with Judge Smith that, by themselves, Mrs 
Clinton‟s remarks concerning courage and having to look after the children 
would not enable a jury reasonably to conclude that s 55(4)‟s definition of a 
qualifying trigger might apply (“circumstances of an extremely grave 
character”; “justifiable sense of being seriously wronged”). Indeed, as 
indicated above, he described her decision to withhold the defence if these 
were the only admissible taunts as “unassailable”.23 This must be correct: such 
taunts, though hurtful and mildly humiliating, are not even close to satisfying 
the language of s 55(4).  
In light of this and the fact that the most prominent feature of Mr 
Clinton‟s narrative was his wife‟s sexual infidelity, it is clear that, where s 
55(4) is concerned, Lord Judge CJ saw sexual infidelity performing the 
predominant normative work at Mr Clinton‟s retrial. Thus, though the 
language of „context‟ implies the framing of other factors that themselves are 
central, the contextual approach as applied in Clinton means sexual infidelity 
can be the principal reason for the presence of a qualifying trigger despite s 
55(6)(c).
24
 It therefore turns out that the contextual approach is not 
„contextual‟ at all. Furthermore, where the result in Clinton is concerned, a 
form of alchemy is occurring: factors that it is agreed are not even close to 
satisfying the language of s 55(4) are combining with a factor that s 55(6)(c) 
states should be disregarded so that, as whole, s 55(4) may be satisfied. This is 
strange to say the least. 
If the contextual approach is taken to its logical conclusion, it would 
merely require that the sexual infidelity be accompanied by any reason, 
however morally trivial, that may have played some part in the loss of self-
control. Thus where a pattern of sexual infidelity was accompanied by some 
minor taunt about missing a party at the in-laws, the mere presence of the 
taunt would overcome the exclusion contained within s 55(6)(c). Given the 
multi-faceted nature of the breakdown of the vast majority of relationships, 
such that losses of self-control purely on the basis of sexual infidelity are 
likely to be rare, such an approach would amount to a cynical avoidance of 
the letter and spirit of s 55(6)(c).
25
 Indeed it would undermine any purpose the 
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 See n 13 above.  
24
 As also pointed out by Baker and Zhao: see n 2 above at 265 (where they describe 
the sexual infidelity in Clinton as the “dominant contributory trigger”) and 266 (where 
they describe the sexual infidelity in Clinton as the “overriding trigger”).   
25
 Thus I largely agree with the following statement of Nicola Wake, also made in 
light of the complexity of the breakdown of relationships: “It is difficult to see when 
„sexual infidelity‟ will be the only element to be relied on in support of a qualifying 
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Act could have in excluding sexual infidelity from consideration. Yet there is 
nothing in Lord Judge CJ‟s judgment to prevent this approach being adopted.  
An alternative and perhaps more acceptable way of conceiving the 
contextual approach would be to require that the non-sexual elements play the 
predominant role in ascertaining the presence of a qualifying trigger, with 
sexual infidelity merely tipping the balance so to speak. Thus though the non-
sexual elements might fall short of completely satisfying the normative 
benchmark established by s 55(4), the contextual approach so conceived 
would demand that they go some significant way in doing so in order to admit 
the sexual infidelity. Thus when the other reasons for losing self-control do 
not have such moral merit, the sexual infidelity would be caught by s 55(6)(c). 
However this approach would require judges (under s 54(6)) to exercise a 
further layer of normative judgment where the defence is concerned, 
introducing more discretion and complexity to a defence already requiring a 
subtle mix of normative judgment and psychological insight.  
Given that the contextual approach thus involves either a somewhat 
cynical avoidance of s 55(6)(c) or, if not, adds even more complexity to an 
already highly complex defence, it is submitted that, for these reasons too, the 
contextual approach should be rejected.  
 
Reason 3 for Rejecting the Contextual Approach: the Functions of Sections 
55(4) and 54(1)(c) 
 
In order to outline the third and final reason for rejecting the contextual 
approach, it is first necessary to explain the contrasting roles played by ss 
55(4) and 54(1)(c) of the Act.  
As we have seen, s 55(4), in defining a qualifying trigger, requires that the 
defendant has lost self-control for reasons that satisfy certain normative 
criteria (“circumstances of an extremely grave character”; “justifiable sense of 
being seriously wronged”). On the other hand, s 54(1)(c) focuses on the 
exercise of the psychological faculty of self-control, withholding the defence 
unless “a person of [the defendant's] sex and age, with a normal degree of 
tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of [the defendant], might 
have reacted in the same or in a similar way to [the defendant]”. This latter 
provision is concerned with the defendant‟s management of his emotions and 
actions at the moment of killing, imposing a standard based on “normal” 
levels of tolerance and self-restraint, and withholding the defence if that 
standard is not met. Two examples are suggested to illustrate its function, both 
of these accepting an actual loss of self-control due to a qualifying trigger. 
First, the time between the final „triggering‟ act and the act of killing may be 
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of a length and nature such that the defendant can be expected to have 
exercised of self-control despite the moral gravity of the provocation. Second, 
the nature of the relationship between victim and defendant, say that of a 
mother and her son, may be such that self-restraint is to be expected however 
morally grave the „trigger‟ leading to the loss of self-control.  
Lord Judge CJ argues that s 54(1)(c), by omitting any reference to sexual 
infidelity, allows for the jury to take account of sexual infidelity in assessing 
whether self-control should have been lost, and considers this “counter 
intuitive” when, on one view, the jury are simultaneously forbidden from 
considering sexual infidelity when addressing the question of a qualifying 
trigger.
26
 The contextual approach thereby (partially) avoids this odd 
possibility. However this counter intuitivism disappears when the different 
roles played by ss 55(4) and 54(1)(c) articulated above are focused on. An 
example given by Lord Judge CJ to demonstrate the need for the contextual 
approach can, ironically, be used to demonstrate this.  
The example concerns a wife who has been physically abused by her 
husband over a long period; during the course of another beating at his hands, 
he taunts her for the first time about various acts of sexual infidelity, as a 
result of which she snaps and reacts with fatal force.
27
  On the basis that the 
abuse by itself is insufficient to constitute a qualifying trigger, Lord Judge CJ 
argues that, in this case, the taunts of sexual infidelity should enable the 
finding that a qualifying trigger is in place, stating: “Yet in the real world the 
husband‟s conduct over the years, and the impact of what he said on the 
particular occasion when he was killed, should surely be considered as a 
whole”.28 But what Lord Judge CJ has lost sight of is that s 55(4) is a purely 
normative test not necessarily concerned with the exact moment self-control 
was lost: what it asks for is a reason for the loss of self-control that survives 
certain normative filters, with s 55(6)(c) forbidding the use of sexual infidelity 
in this regard. In his example, the acts of physical abuse satisfy those filters; 
indeed, it is hard to see what additional normative impact the taunt would 
have relative to that physical abuse.
29
 However, the fact that the loss of self-
                                                     
26 [32]. Baker and Zhao have argued that Lord Judge CJ‟s concern with regard to this 
point is misplaced since the jury will not be considering s 54(1)(c) unless they are 
satisfied a qualifying trigger is in place, and, if the only „trigger‟ is that of sexual 
infidelity, then the absence of a qualifying trigger means there is no need to consider s 
54(1)(c): see n 2 above at 270. However this is not strictly correct as there may be a 
qualifying trigger not linked to sexual infidelity, and yet the question of sexual 
infidelity can still arise under s 54(1)(c) because it played a role in the loss of self-
control. 
27




 Lord Judge CJ acknowledges, ibid, that such abuse in a different case to his 
example could constitute a qualifying trigger, but says it would not do so in his 
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control in his example would not make sense without the sexual taunt can be 
addressed under s 54(1)(c), by (perhaps) helping to explain why “a person of 
[the defendant's] sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint and in the circumstances of [the defendant]”, would have lost self-
control at the moment of killing. Thus the psychological impact of sexual 
infidelity is admissible under s 54(1)(c) in assessing the defendant‟s exercise 
of self-control, but should not be considered when assessing the presence of a 
qualifying trigger.  
What the above example reveals is that a loss of self-control will occur at 
a particular moment in time but the reasons for that loss of self-control can 
occur over a period of time and operate cumulatively. When presented with 
such a situation, the judge under s 54(6) will not only have to decide whether 
any of those reasons might reasonably satisfy s 55(4), but will also have to 
decide whether the reasons so identified played a sufficient role in explaining 
the loss of self-control. However, unlike the normative judgment articulated 
above as part of Reason 2 for rejecting the contextual approach, this exercise 
of judgment is unavoidable given there will often be many reasons for a loss 
of self-control. However, after at least one reason has been found that both 
plays a sufficient role in explaining the loss of self-control and satisfies s 
55(4), s 54(1)(c) becomes relevant, at which point sexual infidelity can play a 
role in assessing the exercise of self-control. This is a perfectly workable 
arrangement and not in the slightest bit counter intuitive. Thus, under this 
arrangement, the defence would certainly fail in Clinton but perhaps succeed 
in Lord Judge CJ‟s example. As such one of Lord Judge CJ‟s reasons for the 
contextual approach disappears, again favouring the compartmentalisation and 
exclusion of sexual infidelity where the question of a qualifying trigger is 
concerned. 
The three reasons articulated above against the contextual approach are 
not concerned with the more fundamental question of whether the defence 
would be improved if s 55(6)(c)‟s prohibition of sexual infidelity was 
repealed tout court. It is to this question that attention will now turn in the 
final part of this case commentary.  
 
THE MERIT OF EXCLUDING SEXUAL INFIDELITY 
 
Section 55(6)(c) is concerned with a complex moral problem, which is the 
moral significance of sexual infidelity and violent reactions to it. Given this 
complexity, the language of s 55(6)(c), which, when interpreted literally, 
creates a rule removing sexual infidelity from the equation without exception, 
                                                                                                                              
example because the wife would have continued to endure it but for the sexual taunts. 
However, the fact that she personally would have endured the abuse has no bearing on 
its normative significance and ability to satisfy the language of s 55(4).  
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perhaps does risk injustice. However, ascertaining whether injustice is indeed 
risked requires an exploration of the moral significance of violent reactions to 
sexual infidelity. Two schools of thought can be identified where that moral 
significance is concerned.  
For some, violence as a result of sexual infidelity is a moral evil and a 
manifestation of a wider problem concerning the male use of violence against 
female partners. This violence is seen as an exercise in control that denies the 
identity of the woman and reduces her autonomy in the name of her male 
partner‟s interests; to use the phrase of Leila Tov-Ruach, it is designed to 
secure a woman‟s “unconditional, unjudgmental attentive acceptance”.30 
Thus, according to this school of thought, violence triggered by real and/or 
imagined sexual infidelity is rooted in a deeply problematic attitude to 
women. For this reason, the legal system has sought, at the substantive, 
procedural and enforcement level, to take the problem of male violence 
against female partners seriously.
31
 Section 55(6)(c) is therefore part of an 
ongoing project of ensuring that such violence is in no way condoned or 
excused by the legal system, but rather condemned.  
On the other hand there is another view of sexual infidelity and violence, 
set out by Lord Judge CJ himself; he states: 
 
“Nevertheless daily experience in both criminal and family courts 
demonstrates that the breakdown of relationships, whenever they 
occur, and for whatever reason, is always fraught with tension and 
difficulty, with the possibility of misunderstanding and the potential 
for apparently irrational fury. Meanwhile experience over many 
generations has shown that, however it may become apparent, when it 
does, sexual infidelity has the potential to create a highly emotional 
situation or to exacerbate a fraught situation, and to produce a 
completely unpredictable, and sometimes violent response. This may 
have nothing to do with any notional „rights‟ that the one may believe 
                                                     
30
 “Jealousy, Attention, and Loss” in Amelie O Rorty (ed) Explaining Emotions 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) p 483. In much the same vein, Margo 
Wilson and Martin Daly state: “...violence against wives is a product of self-interested 
male motives directed at constraining wives‟ autonomy by „encouraging‟ them to 
prioritize their husband‟s wants rather than their own”; see Wilson and Daly “Lethal 
and Nonlethal Violence Against Wives and the Evolutionary Psychology of Male 
Sexual Proprietariness” in R E Dobash and R P Dobash (eds) Rethinking Violence 
Against Women (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998) p 199. 
31
 See, for example, Chapter 4 “Domestic Violence” in S Harris-Short and J Miles 
Family Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 edn, 
2011) p 203.  
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 165 
that he or she has over the other, and often stems from a sense of 
betrayal and heartbreak, and crushed dreams.”32  
 
This second school of thought acknowledges that a man or woman can be 
driven to morally legitimate anger and despair by a campaign of sexual 
betrayal, taunting and humiliation. On such occasions, sexual infidelity is a 
morally significant betrayal of trust with traumatic psychological effects that 
can, on occasion, partially excuse even fatal violence.
33
  
Though the first school of thought will almost always be the correct 
assessment of violence in response to sexual infidelity, there will remain some 
situations where the second is true. In light of this, the problem with s 55(6)(c) 
is that, interpreted in its most far reaching form, it will prevent the court from 
considering sexual infidelity even in situations reflecting the second school of 
thought.
34
 Thus it would be arguably just to repeal the sub-section so that 
cases involving sexual infidelity became eligible for consideration under s 
55(4). It would then be hoped that, given the very high moral standards 
articulated by s 55(4) (“extremely grave character‟; „justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged”), judges (under s 54(6)) would only let juries consider the 
defence, and juries will only let the defence succeed, when the sexual 
infidelity under consideration reflected the second school of thought.  
However, once the door to sexual infidelity is opened, there is the danger 
of drift towards the acceptance of unmeritorious cases.
35
 Arguably Clinton is 
an example of such drift, as it is not clear how Mrs Clinton‟s sexual infidelity, 
when added to her contempt for Mr Clinton‟s lack of courage to commit 




 For an articulation of this argument see Reed and Wake “Sexual Infidelity 
Killings....” above n 2, p 128: “...a loss of self-control in response to the actions of a 
faithless lover, in some cases, has much more to do with the breach of trust involved, 
and serious relationship violation, rather than proprietorial instinct.” 
34
 Jeremy Horder comments on the dangers of a blanket prohibition where sexual 
infidelity is concerned in a discussion of clause 46(6)(c), the identical provision from 
the Coroners and Justice Bill: see his Memorandum to the House of Commons 
(Coroners and Justice Bill, Committee Stage, 3 February 2009, CJ 01). Horder states: 
“One of the difficulties about being „absolutist‟ in this area is that one prevents the 
jury hearing rare meritorious cases.”   
35
 An example of such drift can be found in the behaviour of the judge at first instance 
in Davies (1975) QB 691, who left the common law defence of provocation to the jury 
in an instance of a killing motivated by the victim‟s infidelity to her husband, the 
defendant. The jury nevertheless correctly convicted of murder. On appeal, Lord 
Widgery CJ‟s described leaving the defence to the jury as being “too generous” (see 
702). In Ibrams (1982) 74 Crim App R 154 the decision to leave the defence to the 
jury at first instance in Davies was endorsed as “over-lenient” by Lawton LJ (see 
159). See also the discussion at n 39 below. 
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suicide and her indifference to the children, could, as a whole, satisfy the 
normatively exceptional language of s 55(4). After all, there was nothing 
exceptional about the Clintons‟ breakup, sexual infidelity or otherwise.  
Indeed, when a more global approach to the evidence in Clinton is taken, 
it emerges that there was evidence that Mr Clinton‟s attitude to his wife was 
coloured by the defects of the first school of thought outlined above. The 
attack on Mrs Clinton‟s Land Rover was a vengeful and vindictive attack in 
light of the discovery of her association with Mr Montgomery; after a visit to 
Relate on the 13
th
 of November, Mr Clinton showed her a note that he had 
written on his computer that lists, amongst the difficulties between them, “my 
bullying”;36 when her interest in him began to wane from March 2010, he 
suggested she had become “tarty” and “slutty”.37 At this point, the following 
observations of Samuel H Pillsbury on the moral nature of reactions to sexual 
infidelity are pertinent: 
 
“The challenge in modern provocation law is to distinguish between at 
least two different kinds of provocation-for-infidelity claims—those 
based on betrayal of a particular, personal trust, and those based on 
patriarchal rage-at-dispossession. ...Imagine a case in which the 
married partners have made a particularly strong commitment to 
sexual fidelity. Perhaps one partner has suffered in the past from a 
lover‟s infidelity and made fidelity a special requirement of the 
current relationship. In this case discovery of adultery may support 
great rage. But in other cases we may read rage at infidelity less as an 
expression of moral betrayal and more as an assertion of a man‟s (or 
in some instances a woman‟s) need to posses and control a partner. 
We need to look at the whole context of the relationship and 
especially the state of the relationship prior to the infidelity. Did the 
relationship violate a fundamental norm of the partners at the time, or 
was it just one in a series of mutually hurtful actions in a troubled 
relationship? Did it occur during a separation period or when the 
bonds of loyalty and partnership were still in force? These are the 
questions that should predominate...”38 
 
When these questions are directed at the facts of Clinton, it emerges that the 
moral foundations of Mr Clinton‟s claim were very weak: as Mrs Clinton was 
no longer living with her husband, the bonds of partnership, if not entirely of 
loyalty, were no longer in force; the emotional difficulties between the 




 [63].  
38
 Judging Evil: Rethinking the Law of Murder and Manslaughter (New York and 
London: New York University Press, 1998) p 150.  
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partners were tangible, not hidden by either partner; a pattern of mutually 
hurtful actions was in place, not least the vandalising of Mrs Clinton‟s Land 
Rover by Mr Clinton. When these factors are combined with Mr Clinton‟s 
intense focus on making the marriage work in spite of all the evidence, a 
picture emerges of a man not with a justifiable sense of being seriously 
wronged, but simply having extreme difficulty with his wife losing interest in, 
and then leaving, him, all too common occurrences. His was “rage-at-
dispossession”, to use Pillsbury‟s phrase. Thus, when the facts are considered 
as a whole, it becomes very difficult to see how the language of s 55(4) could 
be satisfied. 
Given that Clinton was the first time the Court of Appeal was addressing 
the nature of s 55(6)(c) and given that its conclusions were always going to 
draw attention, the fact that Mr Clinton‟s case had so little merit does not 
bode well for the future behaviour of judges under s 54(6). As for juries, 
perhaps they will be more discerning when considering the presence of a 
qualifying trigger, but there is evidence that they cannot always be trusted not 
to accept unmeritorious cases.
39
 
In light of this danger of drift towards the acceptance of unmeritorious 




To conclude, if the contextual approach to s 55(6)(c) is maintained, let us 
hope judges and juries display the necessary critical thinking so that, once and 
for all, this partial defence is freed from its association with a sexist vision of 
the relationship between men and women. The danger is that they will not 
                                                     
39
 For an account of the potential of judges and juries to accept unmeritorious cases in 
instances of male violence against women following infidelity, see Horder 
Provocation and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) pp 192-194. In this 
regard the case of Mellentin [1985] 7 Cr App R (s) 9, cited by Horder, is of particular 
interest. A conviction of manslaughter had been returned for a man who had killed his 
wife after she had taunted him with regard to his lack of sexual prowess compared to 
her extra-marital lovers. He appealed against his 5 year sentence, which was reduced 
to 4 years by the Court of Appeal. The following observation of Russell J, who gave 
the judgment of the Court, is noteworthy: “But later, perhaps inflamed by the drink 
they had consumed, the couple began to argue and in particular Mrs Mellentin began 
to boast about her associations with other men. This of course all comes from the 
appellant and in the nature of things cannot be corroborated, but we have no reason to 
suspect that what he ultimately told the police was other than an accurate account of 
what transpired.” The danger within this last sentence is that the killer‟s account will 
almost always be the only one available, as was the case in Clinton. The possibility 




display the necessary critical thinking, resulting in a drift towards the 
acceptance of unmeritorious cases. If this occurs, one can see the day coming 
when s 55(6)(c) will find itself interpreted in the manner of Judge Smith at 
first instance in Clinton.  
